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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Forest Rights Act: Scheduled Tribes and Other Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) 
Act 2006, (FRA) of India, referred to as the Forest Rights Act or FRA in this article, grants enhanced 
rights to forest peoples in lands that they have occupied or used, often for generations (Government of 
India, 2012). The Forest Rights Act is framed in progressive rights-based language; it recognises that 
the “historical injustice” of land dispossession of indigenous peoples of India, called Adivasis,1 needs 
to be addressed (Government of India, 2012). In addition to Adivasis’ individual rights, the FRA also 
respects community forest rights. This is a revolutionary advance in land rights, changing the concept 
of generic property laws. Property laws that are conventionally based on individual ownership are 
now incorporating the recognition of communal land rights. The expectation from new social 
legislation such as the FRA in India is that it should increase justice for those whom the legislation 
seeks to protect. This newly acquired access to justice should theoretically, according to the terms of 
the FRA, enable indigenous forest peoples to claim ancestral land rights, to continue their forest based 
livelihoods, and to conserve the forests. In practice, however, a very different narrative of social 
justice emerges. Social justice, defined as the equitable distribution of fundamental resources, and 
respect for cultural diversity such that no minority groups and their political interaction are 
undermined  (Basok, Tanya; Ilcan, Suzan; Noonan, Jeff 2006) 267. Fraser argues that social justice 
today needs to take into account both redistribution of resources and recognition of cultural diversity, 
which tend to be polarized in today’s debate (Fraser, Nancy 1998).Larson and Murtadha point out 
how the inequity within the redistribution of resources and respect for human rights have become 
intrinsic to society’s norms and theories and governance  (Larson, C. L; Murtadha, K. 2002) 134. I 
posit the grassroots reality of the implementation of the FRA is the product of competing political 
interests and conflicting values, as is often the case when social injustice occurs.  
 
                                        
1 ‘Adivasi’ is the Indian name for the original inhabitants of the Indian subcontinent. The Indian government 
uses several terms interchangeably: Adivasi, or tribal, Schedule Tribes, or SC for the ancient communities who 
reside in the hills and forests. Dash and Khotari, Forest Rights and Conservation in India (2012, 151). 
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Proponents of a free-market capitalist view of development, argue that it is often an economic 
necessity for the government to appropriate forest lands (and thereby disregard the FRA). This 
argument, however, is problematic due to two principal concepts. Firstly, the key is whether 
appropriating land for legitimate development is done in a just and fair manner. If not, injustice often 
disproportionately affects the most marginalised in society, thereby exacerbating inequality and 
poverty in society. Furthermore, any consideration, whether economic, or whether it pertains to 
political interests of the judiciary, should not stop the law from being upheld. These two arguments 
conflict with the neoliberal view that any laws impeding economic development should be reviewed 
due to economic development being seen as an absolute good. The neoliberal view also undermines 
the assumption that more laws equate to more rights, and that rights automatically deliver justice. This 
is illustrated in the case study in this article, which highlights one of many examples of continuous 
land dispossession within this context. The case study also emphasises the gender biases inherent in 
the reaction of officialdom which, while increasing the vulnerability of women to oppression, 
highlights the opposing roles of “women as victims and women as actors” (Agarwal, 1992)119. The 
displacement of people from their lands by the government thus raises another more complex 
question: what characteristics of the legal and political system enable those charged with carrying out 
the law to suspend administrative justice2 and circumvent existing legal frameworks?  
 
The purpose of this article is thus to examine the current land struggles of forest peoples in the context 
of the legal frameworks of the FRA; the colonial legal legacy of the past; and  the neoliberal doctrine 
of the present. I argue that the impact of the FRA for indigenous access to justice is impeded by two 
central factors. Firstly, the legal framework of the FRA is alien to Advisasi’s legal traditions, thereby 
impeding the use of the FRA as a tool to access justice.  Secondly, the legal response towards any 
demands for justice is driven by underlying political and economic ideologies of the elected 
                                        
2 Administrative justice is defined as “when the government, or those working on its behalf, 
act in ways that appear wrong, unfair or unjust, [and do not ensure] that public bodies and 
those who exercise public functions make the right decisions…[and that]mechanisms for 
providing redress when things go wrong”2 are not accessible for citizens, consumers, 
individuals or groups. UK Administrative Justice. https://ukaji.org 
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government which can similarly hinder justice. In principle, newly enacted progressive legislation 
promises justice. I will examine whether this promise of justice is being realised through the FRA, 
and how the government determines access to justice of marginalised groups in India.   
 
This article is structured as follows: section two provides an overview of the history of tribal rights 
and law in India, and how contemporary Indian law has been influenced by colonial priorities that 
alienate customary tribal traditions. Section three outlines the human rights and social justice 
ideologies that underpin the FRA in India, and examines whether it provides adequate substantive and 
procedural access to justice. In section four, I explore the role of the state and the judiciary in enabling 
justice for marginalised groups such as the Gaddi tribe in India, in the changing context of 
globalisation and neoliberal economic ideologies. Section five uses a contemporary case study in 
order to examine the analytical framework proposed in the first three sections. The potential 
displacement of the Gaddi tribal community in the northern Indian state of Himachal Pradesh 
illustrates the indigenous forest people’s struggle to claim their legal rights under the FRA in India. In 
section six, I draw together an analysis arguing that in the government response to land rights, the 
neoliberal governance paradigm collides with rights based approaches to governance and 
development. Section seven concludes by taking stock of the way in which all these factors interface 
with the quest for justice by indigenous forest peoples. I close by proposing that the neo-colonial legal 
system and the neoliberal governance structures subvert the enactment of land rights legislation and 
undermine legal empowerment.    
 
2. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND LAND LAW 
 
Land displacement of tribal peoples began under colonial rule when forests were recognised as a rich 
source of revenue and converted to sovereign territory. The concept of terra nullius or ‘empty lands’ 
was used to expropriate indigenous lands in the past (Gilbert and Doyle, 2011, 5). Terra nullius is a 
principle that indigenous peoples are still fighting against in an effort to reclaim lost ancestral lands. 
Land has historically been tied closely to indigenous identity, and characterised by a collective 
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relationship to resources, and to social and spiritual well being. (Tugendhat and Dictaan-Bang-oa, 
2013, 2). For example, a group of Torres Strait Islanders challenging the terra nullius concept at the 
High Court of Australia in 1992, managed to get it rejected and to obtain recognition of their ancestral 
land tenure. Consequently the Native Title Act of 1993 was passed to protect indigenous titles 
(Hunter, 2014, no page).  
 
In India, the ancient ancestral ownership and occupation rights of tribal forest peoples in India were 
first disregarded under colonial rule in 1874, when the colonial administration deemed all the Adivasi 
areas as being “outside the jurisdiction of the normal administration,” and called them ‘scheduled 
areas’. The tribal populations of India are still referred to as ‘scheduled tribes’. The Scheduled 
Districts Act XVI, 1874, the Government of India Act 1919 and the Government of India Act, 1935, 
facilitated control of Adivasi lands, which were abundant in natural and mineral resources (Bhengra, 
Bijoy and Luithui, 1999); (Dash and Khotari, 2012); (Gadgil and Guha, 1992); (Karanth and Defries, 
2010). In the 1950s, the ‘schedule’ or list of forest and hill tribes compiled by the British in 1874 was 
incorporated into the constitution of independent India. Colonial jurisprudence strongly influenced the 
legal environment in the postcolonial period, as shown by laws such as the Wild Life (Protection) Act 
1972 and Forest Conservation Act 1980. Both laws continued the exclusion of indigenous peoples in 
India, in which wildlife protection took priority over housing and livelihoods of forest people. Other 
policy mechanisms such as the National Forest Policy of 1988, and the Joint Forest Management 
programme reinforced the control of the Forest Department3 over the lives of indigenous peoples, 
perpetuating ecological imperialism and dispossession (Springate-Baginski et al., 2008, 9). 
 
Contemporary law in India, as it developed, initially followed the classic legal traditions of the West. 
Decolonised societies, however, have had to jettison the traditions that kept them controlled under 
imperial domination and repression, which Galanter refers to as the “expropriation of law” (Galanter, 
1968, 67). Galanter also points out that this legal tradition is alien to Indian traditions, “Foreign in 
                                        
3 This Department is an agency of the Indian national government that traditionally has had 
jurisdiction over forests nationwide.  
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origin and in inspiration, notoriously incongruent with the attitudes and concerns of much of the 
population, [the Western legal tradition] displaced a major intellectual and institutionally complex one 
within a highly developed civilization.”(Galanter, 1968, 65); (Kidder, 1977). It was only after 
colonisation that modern India was unified into a single ‘nation’ governed by a foreign power, from 
formerly discrete kingdoms of varying sizes, characterised by different cultures and languages. Part of 
this governance system was the establishment of a unified modern legal system. The new legal system 
shared characteristics with the foreign ruler, the bureaucracy, mechanics, and protocols of which were 
alien to the local Hindu, Muslim and other Indian legal traditions. Given that tribal communities in 
India are for the most part unexposed to the Western/British legacy either through education or 
through the law, attempting to engage with such a culturally unfamiliar legal structure serves to 
impede their own legal empowerment. This is further exacerbated by high rates of illiteracy and 
geographical isolation.   
 
Indigenous law in India operated through informal ‘tribunals’, which “represented a multiplicity of 
systems with no fixed authoritative body of law, no set binding precedents, no single legitimate way 
of applying or changing the law”(Galanter, 1968, 71). When referred on to the government’s courts, 
these tribunals were transformed and curtailed. Informal systems of dispute settlement were and still 
are influence by unwieldy foreign systems of litigation since colonization, to which the Adivasis are 
subjected. Some of this litigation, inevitably contentious in nature, might have been peaceably settled 
through traditional tribunals. The new Western principle of ‘equality before the law’ dismissed the 
status and communal ties of the parties involved, and traditional ‘mediation’ methods were rejected 
for the contemporary ‘win or lose’ culture. “The new courts not only created new opportunities for 
intimidation and harassment and new means for carrying on old disputes, but they also gave rise to a 
sense of individual right, not dependent on opinion or usage, and capable of being actively enforced 
by government, even in opposition to community opinion”(Galanter, 1968, 70); (Cohn, 1959); 
(Rudolph & Rudolph, 1969). On the other hand, a positive aspect of the decline of indigenous 
tribunals was the decrease of traditional sanctions such as boycotting and “outcasting” of persons or 
groups. Taken within this legal context, Adivasis, when faced with dispossession of their lands have 
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had recourse to a legal tradition that is intrinsically alien to local informal tribunals. This raises the 
question of whether the externally imposed legal tradition in India results in an obstruction to access 
to justice for indigenous groups. The following section takes this discussion of access to justice into 
the realm of social justice and rights. 
 
3. RIGHTS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
 
The FRA in India reflects a global move towards the recognition of human rights and is founded on 
principles of social justice. Social justice norms, which guide national and international normative 
frameworks, are increasingly influenced by human rights norms. Human rights, which has become 
part of the dominant legal norm in contemporary global conceptualisation, have similarly shaped 
international history (Gauri and Gloppen, 2012, 485). The French Revolution, the US civil rights 
movement, independence from colonial imperialism and the discontinuation of the slave trade 
exemplify paradigm shifts in human rights norms. It was only in 1948, in response to the atrocities of 
WWII, however, that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights laid out moral foundations of justice 
and freedom and became a mainstream legal norm internationally. In line with these international 
legal norms and human rights frameworks, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 
on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of 1989, No. 169, on right to continue traditional occupations, and 
the 2007 UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, are major legal contributions to land 
rights of indigenous people (Gilbert and Doyle, 2011).  
 
Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, human rights standards are developed by agencies 
at a supra-national level that formulate policies on human rights. This produced international bodies 
which formulate and implement the policies (Galligan and Sandler, 2004, 26).  While human rights 
standards are developed at the international level, responsibility for the implementation of the 
international standards lies with individual nation states. This both weakens accountability to human 
rights standards and results in an uneven interpretation and implementation of human rights norms 
across nations (Galligan and Sandler, 2004, 48).  Traditionally, the international bodies engaged in 
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setting human rights standards attempted to direct and facilitate the implementation at national levels.  
More recently however, we see the introduction of forms of direct implementation of international 
law, with discrete legal systems. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (UNCESCR) describes a “minimum core” obligation by which a state has to ensure an 
indispensable set of social economic rights such as the right to housing. The state has to comply with 
the essential level for each right. The essential level is generally determined by the most vulnerable 
group and the protection of their rights, as understood in international law.4    
  
The weakness of the policy of individual states being obligated to comply with the minimum core of 
social economic rights is highlighted by Amartya Sen. He challenges the ‘coherence’ of the human 
rights approach, and “the intellectual edifice of human rights,” through three critiques (Sen, 2001, 
227). Firstly, he questions the legitimacy of human rights since they are based on ‘pre legal 
principles’ and are not justiciable rights, which adds confusion to the legal system. The status of 
human rights is therefore weakened since they are entitlements sanctioned by the state, which is the 
ultimate legal authority. The second critique pertains to what he calls ‘coherence’. Since rights have 
to be provided by an authority or a state, for example “the right to food or to medicine”, Sen argues 
that they can be a “hollow” concept, especially if the agency in charge does not provide the food or 
medicine, or in the case of this essay, land rights. Thirdly, he questions the universality of the social 
ethics of human rights, and whether they are held in the equal regard by all cultures (Sen, 2001, 228). 
 
In India, in response to this expectation of a minimum core of social economic rights, the Forest 
Rights Act provides a legal framework for the protection of substantive rights for tenurial security of 
vulnerable forest peoples and indigenous groups. The Forest Rights Act, framed in rights based 
language, is perceived as “contemporary India’s largest land regime change” (Sambhav et al., 2013, 
no page). It has the potential to change forest governance and to empower forest communities. The 
Forest Rights Act was passed 2006 and became effective on 1 January 2008. The law notes that it is 
                                        
4 Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at para. 31 in Varun 
Gauri and Daniel M. Brinks, Courting Social Justice (Varun Gauri and Daniel M. Brinks eds, Cambridge 
University Press 2008) 
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intended to address the “historical injustice” suffered by tribal peoples and other forest dwellers who 
have lived for generations in the forests yet whose “rights on ancestral lands and their habitat were not 
adequately recognised in the consolidation of State forests during the colonial period as well as in 
independent India.” The law also explicitly states that its purposes include addressing the 
consequences of development by the State:  the Act is meant to address the “long standing insecurity 
of tenurial and access rights of forest dwelling Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers 
including those who were forced to relocate their dwelling due to State development interventions” 
(Government of India, 2012, 1).  
 
An estimated two hundred million people in India who are dependent on the forests for livelihoods 
and habitat may benefit from the FRA (Sarin and Springate-Baginski, 2010, 6). When Twenty three 
percent of India’s forest lands were designated as state forests, for the use of extractive industries, the 
due legal process of recognising pre-existing customary rights was not respected. “It is this population 
of the country’s poorest people, numbering perhaps one hundred million, who have suffered 
institutionalised disenfranchisement during colonial rule and after independence, who stand to benefit 
the most from proper implementation of the FRA” (Sarin and Springate-Baginski, 2010, 6).  
 
Two groups of people are granted substantive rights under the FRA.  First, “Forest Dwelling 
Scheduled Tribes,” defined as members or community of the Scheduled Tribes who primarily reside 
in and who depend on the forests and forest lands for bona fide livelihood needs and includes the 
Scheduled Tribe pastoralist communities. The second group of people granted rights under the FRA 
are “Other Traditional Forest Dwellers,” defined as any member or community who has from 1930 
and before “primarily resided in and who depends on the forest or forests land for bona fide livelihood 
needs.”  It is important to note that not only individual, but also community rights are recognized. 
The important substantive rights which are granted to those covered by the FRA, include:  (1) the 
right to “hold and live in the forest land under the individual or common occupation for habitation or 
for self-cultivation for livelihood”;  (2) “community rights such as nistar, by whatever name called” 
(“nistar” refers to the necessities of carrying on the business of living, including, in the communal 
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context, timber, pasture, fodder, burial/cremation ground, schools, parks, playgrounds, drains etc.); (3) 
the right “of ownership, access to collect, use, and dispose of minor forest produce which has been 
traditionally collected within or outside village boundaries.”5 (4) “other community rights of uses or 
entitlements such as fish and other products of water bodies, grazing … and traditional seasonal 
resource access of nomadic or pastoralist communities”; (5) the “rights in or over disputed lands 
under any nomenclature in any State where claims are disputed.6 (6) “rights for conversion of Pattas 
[titles] or leases or grants issued by any local authority or any State Government on forest lands to 
titles.”  (7) right to protect, regenerate or conserve or manage any community forest resource7 which 
[forest dwellers] have been traditionally protecting and conserving for sustainable use. “This is 
amongst the most powerful and significant rights for re-commoning the enclosures and restoring 
community controlled democratic forest governance within customary village boundaries” (Sarin and 
Springate-Baginski, 2010, 12). None of the rights to land granted under the Act can be either sold or 
otherwise transferred. 
 
A further right granted to those covered by the FRA, is one which explicitly recognizes that forest 
dwellers have been the victims of illegal acts depriving them of their rights in the past, and considers 
rehabilitation to alternative sites. As one can see from reviewing this list, a number of significant 
substantive rights are granted by the terms of the FRA. If implemented as written, the FRA has the 
potential to improve the lives of many who live in the forests and rely on its produce to live, but who 
have been treated unjustly in the past. 
                                        
5 “minor forest produce” is defined to include “all non-timber forest produce of plant origin including 
bamboo, brush wood, stumps, cane, tussar, cocoons, honey, wax, lac, tendu or kendu leaves, 
medicinal plants and herbs, roots, tubers, and the like” Government of India (2012). The Forest 
Rights Act. In NOTIFICATION, M. O. T. (ed.) 6th of September, 2012 ed. New Delhi: Government of 
India Controller of Publications    
6  This right is “meant to enable people to reclaim their rights over lands disputed between them and 
forest departments arising out of faulty or non-existent forest settlements.” Sarin, M. and Springate-
Baginski, O. (2010). India Forest Rights Act - The anatomy of a necessary but not sufficient 
institutional reform. In PAPERS, I. D. (ed.) Research Programme Consortium for Improving 
Institutions for Pro-Poor Growth. Manchester, UK: IDPM School of Environment and 
DevelopmentUniversity of Manchester 10  
7‘Community forest resource’ means “customary common forest land within the traditional or 
customary boundaries of the village, or seasonal use of landscape in the case of pastoral 
communities, including reserved forests, protected forests and protected areas such as Sanctuaries 
and National Parks to which the community had traditional access” ibid.12 
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The procedure for claiming rights under the FRA begins at the village level. The Gram Sabha, a 
village assembly, which under the FRA rules must include not less than one-third women, invites 
claims, verifies them and prepares a map outlining the area of each claim it recommends for 
recognition. The government ministry responsible for implementing the FRA is the Ministry of Tribal 
Affairs (MoTA), rather than the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF). Given that the MoEF 
may be required to surrender significant power, revenue and land under the FRA, many advocates for 
forest dwellers questioned the likelihood that the MoEF would administer the law fairly. Thus the 
assignment of responsibilities under the law to the MoTA was viewed as a victory for forest dwellers 
and their supporters. 
 
The enactment of this progressive social law has not however, translated into the just and equitable 
implementation of law in India. For example, given that the majority of the tribal communities have 
poor access to education, it might be unmanageable to make claims and to collect evidence for the 
claim within three months from the day a claim arises. Two types of proof are required, and 
documentary evidence might be problematic for forest people to produce, such as proving that they 
have occupied the forest land before December 13, 2005 (Section 4.3). There are several issues, but 
this is just one illustration that the legislation is not user friendly. Another is that the claimants must 
prove seventy-five years of residence, which is unreasonable especially as it may exclude a great 
number of people from protection. It fails to take into consideration that this kind of proof is many 
times not available. Moreover, restricting eligibility to ‘scheduled’ tribes also excludes many tribal 
groups, who for some historical administrative reason had not been ’listed’ by the colonial 
government in the ‘schedule’ and fall through the tribal benefits net. (Sarin and Springate-Baginski, 
2010, 18).   
 
The rules have many omissions, including no clarification on either how to claim rights or restrictions 
on rights claimed. Procedures are lacking in how to claim complex rights such as usufruct rights 
which are harmful to pastoral and transhumant communities and communities called Primitive Tribal 
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Groups (PTGs). The unfortunate articulation of how the FRA relates to other existing laws has caused 
ambiguities, especially with contradictions between rights of tribal communities, and conservation 
and wildlife laws. Forest people have always lived in areas which are now labelled as wildlife 
habitats. Conservation and biodiversity protection laws are often at variance with rights of forest 
peoples. The FRA does not provide adequate clarification on these contradictions, nor therefore 
adequate protection for forest peoples. Section 13 of the Act states “Save as otherwise provided in this 
Act and the Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA), the 
provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law 
for the time being in force”(Government of India, 2012).  Under the FRA, Gram Sabha is defined as a 
village assembly. The PESA however defines Gram Sabha as ‘hamlets’, or ‘a group of hamlets’ or 
‘forest villages’, or ‘traditional villages’ etc. The inconsistency has created a lot of harm and 
confusion, and has given the government officials who oppose the decentralized decision-making, a 
loophole to disregard Gram Sabha decisions. Another obstacle to the decision process for claims is 
that the Gram Sabha, which technically consists of all the adult voters within a certain administrative 
boundary, can entail requiring thousands of villagers from different settlements, which would 
comprise their ‘village’. This becomes unmanageable and a cause for yet another impediment to the 
process (Sarin and Springate-Baginski, 2010, 18).  
 
Under the PESA, Joint Forest Management (JFM) committees were set up with community members 
and the forest department. In principle this was to empower the community to share decision-making. 
In reality however, the forest department dominated the relationship that either disempowered the 
community, or reinforced historical subjugation. The devolution of power to the Gram Sahba, gives 
them statutory rights to manage, conserve and protect forests. In many areas of the country however, 
the forest departments continue to interact with JFM committees which had already been set up, as do 
some NGOs who had encouraged JFMs for the right reasons, but do not seem to be able to relinquish 
this model of forest management for the more empowering one of Gram Sabha authority. To sum up, 
the inconsistencies within the FRA are many, which creates an inadequacy for the law to be perceived 
as successful land reform. The inherent legal inconsistencies of the FRA are further exposed when 
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pitted against the hegemonic ideology of Neoliberalism. It is this ideology which is the focus of the 
next section. 
 
4. NEOLIBERALISM AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
 
Many states in developing countries exhibit features of neoliberal statecraft, so we may ask whether 
their present ideologies have impacted on their understanding of rights, law and justice. In order to 
examine the failure to recognise legal rights of indigenous peoples, which is described in detail in the 
case study below, it is helpful to consider the role of the government, state exploitation of forest lands, 
and the conditions that foster the legal exclusion of indigenous peoples fighting for their land rights.  
Under neoliberal capitalism, the government, the judiciary, the market forces, civil society and 
political society are competing for resources. Harvey captures the essence of neoliberalism when he 
defines it as a “theory of political economic practices that proposes that human wellbeing can best be 
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 
2005, 2).  
 
Though the term Neoliberalism is widely used, a critical discourse on the concept of Neoliberalism is 
still nascent. Emerging as a political economic theory, rooted in Adam Smith’s classical liberalism 
theories (Thorsen, 2010, 8), (Harvey, 2005); the present discourse is eclectic, representing broad and 
often contradictory political perspectives. An economic doctrine that stresses individual freedoms in 
the context of private property, free trade and free market capitalism, Neoliberalism prescribes the 
role of the state as supporting these aspects through guaranteeing the integrity of money and efficient 
functioning of the markets. State support of public facilities such as legal structures and defence is 
justified purely in order to prioritise the success of markets as the necessary pre-condition to the 
welfare for its citizens. State responsibility remains limited, with the emphasis on freedom and self 
regulation of markets (Harvey, 2005,  3); (Thorsen, 2010). Dag Einar Thorsen writes that publications 
on Neoliberalism are often critical, and his interpretation is that Neoliberalism is a loose set of 
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political beliefs with proposes that the state is legitimately responsible for safeguarding individual 
liberty which is perceived in terms of commercial liberty for individuals and corporations, with the 
state’s role as being minimal (Thorsen, 2010, 15).8 
 
Hayek and Friedman, foundational figures in neoliberal ideology, are of the school that advocates an 
individual’s freedom to choose as being spontaneous and ‘natural’, and that a state which manages 
welfare would suppress economic advancement (Thorsen, 2010, 14). These free-market social and 
economic policies, popularly known as the Washington Consensus, (Jessop, 2002, 454) became the 
dominant economic policy during Reagan and Thatcher governments in the US and the UK in the 
1980s, and now pervade national and international financial institutions including those such as the 
IMF, The World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In 1975, the ‘Chicago boys,’ so 
named because they came from the University of Chicago, worked with the IMF at Pinochet’s 
invitation to reshape the Chilean economy along Neoliberal lines (Harvey, 2005, 8). China in 1978, 
India in the 1980s and Sweden in the 1990s all turned decisively towards neoliberalised economies 
(Harvey, 2005)9. Harvey posits that the 1930s capitalist slump and the Second World War shaped the 
neoliberal appeal, as both capitalism and communism were seen to have failed, which activated the 
Bretton Woods agreements and generating global financing and management through the IMF and 
World Bank and the United Nations (Harvey, 2005,  10). After Independence in 1947, a badly 
impoverished India chose strongly supported state economic policies. Concentrating on building an 
industrial base, these policies did not comprehensively address the deep poverty of the majority of 
Indians. The 1980s economic liberalization was the architect of the New Economic Policy of 1991, 
which continued to alienate the impecunious groups such as tribal populations. (Gidwani, 2006, 11); 
 
Michel Foucault, the French philosopher, who has given us post modern and post structural 
understandings of the past in the present through his analysis of psychology, social theory, and history 
of ideas, (Kelly, no date) observes that in the neoliberal tradition, state policies are, even in the social 
                                        
8 Also see Mises 1962; Nozick 1974; Hayek 1979.  
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sphere, strongly influenced by market forces. In support of this, Lemke refers to the allocation of 
inadequate resources, the inequitable aspect of which suffers from competing goals. (Lemke, 2010, 
197). Foucault argues that the neoliberal statecraft attempts to redefine the social sphere as an 
economic domain, which means that the onus is on the government of a nation state to regulate 
competition and the market for individuals, and groups and for institutions (Lemke, 2010, 197).  
 
Humphreys makes a case for neoliberal policies influencing forest laws and environmental 
mechanisms such as the Kyoto Protocol, and the European Union’s Emissions Trading Schemes. He 
argues that in order for neoliberalism to flourish, the government has to be strong and has to introduce 
“market-based disciplines to new areas and create political space that can be occupied by private 
sector businesses” (Humphreys, 2009,319). Humphreys shows, through detailed evidence, that 
neoliberal policies have been influential since the 1992 UNCED forest principles and the latest 2007 
Non-Legally Binding Instrument on all Types of Forests. Specifically, forests continue to be 
prioritized as a corporate resource base for markets and extraction, rather than protected for non-
exploitable sustainability. Other ecological sustainable and social justice forest policies of 
conservation, wildlife protection are competing with neoliberal power, such as when the Convention 
on Biological Diversity which included public-private partnerships as a mechanism for the promotion 
of private investments (Humphreys, 2009,322).  
 
Oishik Sircar takes an unrelenting stand on the erosion of human rights in the context of neoliberalism 
in India. He deems the undermining of rights an illusion of ‘legal emancipation’. Legal emancipation 
being the faith citizens put in their government and in the judicial system in order to be ‘emancipated’ 
from poverty and granted access to justice. The assumption is that laws have the power to grant rights, 
which will guarantee justice. This “linear progression” is what Sircar calls an illusion, or ‘spectacles’ 
through which one incorrectly views the culture of rights as having the potential for emancipation and 
access to justice. Justice, however, is often elusive, by reason of the gap between the expectation of 
justice and the reality of what the law delivers. Sircar argues that neoliberalism is being used by the 
state to justify the “liberal statecraft and market craft, both of which operate through a seamless 
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intersection of managerial and militarised agendas.” This neoliberal statecraft has led to the 
“privatisation of state accountability” and to the “the militarisation of the state (Sircar, 2012, 527),”  
both of which contradict the rights based culture that has been developing. It also compounds the 
betrayal of vulnerable populations who understandably expect that their access to justice should 
increase with the enactment of social justice legislation. Within vulnerable populations, women are 
even more marginalised than men. A neoliberal setting that subordinates the State to the market, 
compromises the protective and ‘just’ role of the courts and that of the constitutional framework. The 
courts, where they are merely instruments of the neoliberal state, are thus used to legitimise what 
Sircar deems state violence. This analytical framework is useful to understand the case below of the 
Gaddi women being arrested in Himachal Pradesh for peacefully protesting for their land rights. It 
bears witness to the ‘illusion’ that more laws equal more rights, which in turn equal more justice.  
 
When the ‘allocation of scant resources for competing goals’ is taken on by the state, from “the 
majoritarian perspective of social betterment”(Sen, 2001, 251), minority rights can be in danger of 
being disregarded to an extreme, as exposed by the pattern of steady dispossession of tribal lands. 
Majority improvement is part of a neoliberal ideology. A hypothetical example of majority 
improvement is illustrated by Sen. He divides a cake between three people called B, C and D, “with 
the assumption that each person votes to maximize only her own share of the cake” (Sen, 2001, 251)  
After voting, a share of person B’s cake is taken away and given to C and D, in the name of “majority 
improvement”. Even if person B is the poorest of the three, this division could continue till B would 
have no cake left. Despite a government’s mandates to protect the most marginalised communities, 
under the concept of majority improvement, this would be justified, creating a contradiction in 
governance.  
 
This uncomplicated cake example has been played out in real life in the displacement of the Gaddi 
tribal communities in the Chamba District described below. These elements of neoliberal statecraft 
and their clash with the social justice and rights based Forest Rights Act, also plays out in the case 
study on land displacement protests,, with negative consequences of land dispossession for the Gaddi 
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Tribe. It reveals the tension between laws framed for social justice and governmental violation of 
these laws. This is particularly difficult to reconcile when the government is obligated to act as the 
ultimate legal authority to ensure access to justice. 
 
5. THE CHAMBA DISTRICT LAND DISPLACEMENT CASE STUDY 
 
During a peaceful protest against plans for a hydroelectricity project,9 which would dispossess them 
of their lands, thirty-five Gaddi tribal10 women were arrested in March 2014, in the northern Indian 
state of Himachal Pradesh. The women, from Holi village of Chamba District had been protesting 
against the proposed hydroelectricity plans for two years. The plans would decimate the dense forests 
they inhabit and result in the loss of their homes. A 15 kilometre long tunnel would be built for the 
project, requiring blasting.  This in turn would dry up the Ravi River on which they depend for water 
resources, and eventually displace the community.  
 
The arrests of the Gaddi women are inconsistent with fundamental rights of citizens of India such as 
the right to equality, the right “to freedom of speech and expression”, and the right to “assemble 
peaceably and without arms” (India, 2007 , Part lll No.14). The arrests also violate forest rights of 
indigenous peoples under the Forest Rights Act of 2006, which indicates that it does not seem to have 
influenced the behavioural norms of either the government or of the judiciary towards land rights of 
the tribal women, at least in Chamba District. In the face of this clear violation of the FRA and the 
seeming disregard for social justice by the government, two fundamental questions arise: do the 
protesting tribal women in Chamba District have legal rights over their land, and has the FRA 
delivered on its promise of greater power and enhanced rights for indigenous peoples in India? The 
                                        
9 180 MW Bajoli Holi Hydroelectricity Project plans promoted since 2012 by a private company called 
GMR. The project involves the diversion of seventy-five hectares of rich Himalayan forests and the 
felling of almost five thousand trees. HimDhara, ‘Action Alert! Tribal Women in Chamba arrested!’ 
(http://www.himdhara.org/2014/03/26/action-alert-tribal-women-in-chamba-arrested/, 2014)  
accessed 12 June 2014 
10 The word ‘tribal’ or Adivasi is a generic term used to describe indigenous peoples in India. ‘Gaddi’ is 
the name of the specific tribe of the women from Holi. 
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adverse effects of development-induced displacement remain unquestioned by those in power and are 
reinforced both by the government and by the corporate sector.  
 
Besides the arrest of the tribal women, as well as the intimidation of the women by local contractors 
and police, to force them to withdraw their protest, the Chamba case revealed several governance 
shortcomings (HimDhara, 2014, no page). The gender based violence implications of police and local 
contractors intimidation of the women does not comply with international standards concerned with 
violence against women.11 Furthermore it compounds the fundamental failure to recognise land rights 
under the Forest Rights Act. The Forest Rights Act grants land rights to both women and men equally. 
The Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) granted approval for the forest clearance to the 
corporation funding the project. This action was taken without referring the matter to the Gram Sabha 
(the meetings of local village councils) 12 as required by the provisions of the Forest Rights Act. The 
approval was made on the basis of a false certificate issued by the Chamba Deputy Commissioner, 
which stated: “there were no claims for forest rights to be settled on the seventy five hectare forest 
land to be diverted for the project” (HimDhara, 2014, no page). In addition to this, the initial plans for 
the hydroelectricity project had called for construction on the bank of the river Ravi where there were 
no forest villages. The MoEF however, gave consent to GMR to shift the project to the opposite river 
bank where several tribal forest villages were situated. The MoEF consent apparently was given 
within one day of the GMR application, while the inhabitants were only informed of the decision two 
years later. This consent was given despite an evaluation report by the Himachal Pradesh State 
                                        
11 CEDAW Committee General Recommendation 19 definition of violence against women (VAW) as “Any act 
of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or 
suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether 
occurring in public or in private life.” Tugendhat and Dictaan-Bang-oa 5 
12 “The Gram Sabha shall be the authority to initiate the process for determining the nature and extent of 
individual or community forest rights or both that may be given to the forest dwelling Scheduled Tribes and 
other traditional forest dwellers within the local limits of its jurisdiction under this Act by receiving claims, 
consolidating and verifying them and preparing a map delineating the area of each recommended claim...” The 
Forest Rights Act Chapter IV 6(1) 
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Electricity Board which examined technical, social, environmental and economic issues in making a 
recommendation against the shift from one river bank to another. 13 
 
A third action harmful to the claims of the tribal women was the ruling of the Himachal Pradesh High 
court, which denied claims filed in support of the tribal women.14 The High Court’s ruling seems 
questionable in light of Section 4(5), in which the FRA prohibits the eviction of forest dwellers from 
forest land under their occupation till completion of the process of recognition of rights.15 The 
Ministry of Tribal Affairs (MoTA) had issued directions in 2012 emphasizing that the protective 
clause against eviction from forest lands is absolute, but this guidance was disregarded both by the 
MoEF and by the High Court, which also reinforces the endemic power imbalance which is “shaped 
not only by gender discrimination within Indigenous and non-Indigenous arenas, but by a context of 
ongoing colonization and militarism; racism and social exclusion; and poverty-inducing economic 
and ‘development’ policies” (FIMI, 2006, 6). 
 
As with any law, the cooperation of various governmental agencies was required for the rights of the 
tribal women under the FRA to be recognised and realized. Among the various stakeholders who 
failed in their legal duty were the MoEF, the state High Court judges, the Chamba Deputy 
Commissioner, and the Police. The Forest Department under the MoEF are obliged to support the 
community and the new legislation. “Forest Departments, however, have shown considerable 
resistance to permitting recognition of the community forest resource (CFR) right as it challenges 
their exclusive territorial jurisdiction and control over forests”(Sarin and Springate-Baginski, 2010, 
24). The case of the Gaddi Tribal community is a sad reminder that however commendable the law’s 
                                        
13 The Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board also pointed out that the GMR had “misrepresented 
some technical issues” in order to justify the geographical shift. (HimDhara 2014) 
14 An option that was pursued by the tribal women with the support of civil society advocates, was to 
get an injunction on the basis that the Gram Sabha consent for forest land diversion had not been 
received and the FRA had therefore not been implemented. (CFR)  Another option considered was 
filing a petition at the state level monitoring committee by the women or other members of the gram 
sabha on their behalf, under section 7 and 8 of FRA challenging the violation of FRA. Copying in the 
Ministry of Tribal Affairs (MoTA) 
15 Section 4(5) of FRA:  “Save as otherwise provided, no member of a forest dwelling Scheduled Tribe 
or other traditional forest dweller shall be evicted or removed from forest land under his occupation 
till the recognition and verification procedure is completed.” The Forest Rights Act 
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intent and however precise its language, legislation will remain just words on paper without the 
cooperation of the government agencies and courts charged with making the law a reality in the lives 
of marginalised people. The case study demonstrates that the implementation of legislation and policy 
is just as political as the process through which a policy is enacted and passed by government. It is 
driven by the ideological orientation of the state and its actors, which as in this case, is inconsistent 
with the human rights and social justice foundation of the FRA. In the case of the Chamba district, it 
has resulted in tribal rights being subverted and undermined at the expense of the more powerful 
neoliberal agenda of the state and private sector interest groups.   
 
The significance of this women-only protest also relates to a global feminization of poverty, in which 
“women comprise the majority of the poor” (Staudt, 1998, 217).16 Agarwal argues that poorer women 
have been “victims of environmental degradation in quite gender-specific ways,” demonstrating that 
they also have also played a significant role in environmental conservation practice (Agarwal, 1992, 
119).  Some of the ecofeminist17 discourse presumes connections between women’s biology and ties 
to nature. I do not expand on that aspect in this article, and am aware of the danger of essentialising 
women’s connection to nature. But I will emphasise the increase in workload specifically for tribal 
women whose division of labour includes gathering firewood, fodder, water, minor forest produce, 
and cultivation of food.  This workload is increased with the degradation of forests and loss of forest 
rivers through hydroelectric dams. In India, women have also been historically part of the active 
opposition to the increasing instances of land dispossession of forest peoples, starting with the much 
                                        
16 “First coined two decades ago, the phrase "the feminization of poverty" focused on women's increasing and 
disproportionate presence among those in poverty. Two phenomena contributed to this trend: first, the 
overrepresentation of women among minimum-waged and unpaid workers; second, the rising percentage of 
women who headed households with dependent children.” Staudt, K. (1998). The Feminization of Poverty: 
Global Perspectives. The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 5(2).2 
17 Ecofeminism is the position that “there are important connections-historical, experiential, symbolic, 
theoretical- between the domination  of women and the domination of nature” (Warren 1990, 126), 
taken from Curtin, D. (1991). Toward an Ecological Ethic of Care Hypatia, 6(1). 60 
“The term ecological feminism or eco-feminism refers to a sensibility, an intimation, that feminist 
concerns run parallel to, are bound up with, or, perhaps, are one with concern for a natural world 
which has been subjected to much the same abuse and ambivalent behavior as have women.” 
Cheney, J. (1987). Eco-Feminism and Deep Ecology. Environmental Ethics, 9(2). 115 
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publicized Chipko Movement of the 1970s when women hugged trees in order to prevent logging and 
deforestation. (Jackson, 1993); (Agarwal, 1992); (Mawdsley, 1998); (Shiva, 1988) 
 
The global reality of women being excluded from the mainstream is compounded for tribal women 
who are excluded as being part of tribal communities and also as being women within their tribes. 
Women in different tribes enjoy different levels of equality.  Some tribes are traditionally matriarchal 
and some are matrilineal. Some have been Sankritised and some were converted to Christianity, and 
have assumed certain patriarchal traditions of other religions that were formally alien (Xaxa, 2004, 
350). Land ownership in many tribal communities is communal, which changes the gender dynamic 
of land rights. In the Khasi communities of Mehgalaya of north eastern India, women historically hold 
the rights of land ownership and men do not (Xaxa, 2004, 354). It is difficult to make generalised 
statements about tribal women in India, since tribal peoples live in many states in India, and differ 
widely from each other.18 Some experiences however, are shared, such as the impact of the erosion of 
natural resources on which they are so dependent for their livelihoods (Xaxa, 2004, 360). The loss of 
livelihoods and dispossession of their lands for all the Gaddi community would gravely impoverish all 
of them. For the women specifically however, gathering food, and the collection water and firewood 
for fuel within their communal gender division of labour would expose them to dangers, when being 
pushed further into the forests in search of their natural resources, such as the threat of wildlife. These 
dangers are important enough for the Gaddi women to protest for two years in spite of intimidation by 
local police and government officials aimed at forcing the protest to end. The Gaddi women’s 
demonstration to claim their rights to their communal lands and to self-determination uniquely 
highlights the multiple discrimination faced by indigenous peoples who are both tribal and female. It 
also displays their leadership and underlines the gender issues inherent in the struggle to retain land 
ownership. 
 
                                        
18 Xaxa’s article on tribal women in different groups all over India makes clear the potential 
inaccuracy of generalised conclusions given the major differences in behaviours and different status 
of women within these groups.  
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Forest lands are a valuable economic resource, exploited by the state in India since the 1800s, when 
the colonial government converted them into sovereign property. The customary ancestral ownership 
and occupation rights of tribal forest peoples in India were first disregarded under colonial rule in 
1874, when the colonial administration facilitated control of Adivasi lands, which were abundant in 
natural and mineral resources, with the enactment of new laws. The Scheduled Districts Act XVI, 
1874, and the Government of India Act 1919 and the Government of India Act, 1935 (Bhengra, Bijoy 
and Luithui, 1999); (Dash and Khotari, 2012); (Gadgil and Guha, 1992); (Karanth and Defries, 2010). 
 
Neoliberalism influences social justice. Social justice in this case, is the recognition and respect for 
the land rights of indigenous forest peoples such as the Gaddi community, who are threatened with 
the loss of their land by plans for a hydroelectric project. It could be argued that economic policies 
followed by the government that allows this scenario of displacement from lands are questionable.  
These policies, which seem to favour the individual and corporate profit over indigenous land rights, 
reflect the neoliberal doctrine.  Harvey points out that “accumulation by dispossession entails a very 
different set of practices from accumulation through the expansion of wage labour in industry and 
agriculture…Dispossession entails the loss of rights…Neoliberal concern for the individual trumps 
any social democratic concern for equality, democracy and social solidarities” (Harvey, 2005, 178) .   
 
The neoliberal endorsement of privatization in the Gaddi case sits uncomfortably not only with the 
concept of land rights but also with the international agreed principles of forest conservation and 
protection of habitats. The Gaddi protest is a reflection of how the state, under neoliberal ideologies, 
is redistributing resources from marginalized groups such as women and indigenous peoples, to the 
economic elite. This proves Harvey’s theory of ‘creative destruction’ of neoliberalisation 
redistributing rather than generating assets and wealth, withdrawing rights to commons, and as in the 
Gaddi case, obstructing indigenous socio-economic patterns, and livelihoods (Harvey, 2005, 159). 
One of the principle tenets of neoliberalism is that the government should not “interfere” in the 
functioning of the market – that there should be a “separation” of government from market.  In that 
sense, the failure of the Indian government to intervene in the Gaddi case is consistent with neoliberal 
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policy, but its abandonment of it’ protect the rights of indigenous people under the FRA has resulted 
in serious harm to the livelihoods and lives of the Gaddi. Gowan describes it in terms of Foucauldian 
governmentality, in which the state is complicit in a “steady abandonment of the majority to 
precariousness” (Gowan, 2013, 2-6); (Gidwani, 2006). It is evidence of a heavy-handed state 
intervention against the interests of the subaltern, and reminiscent of the lack of ‘coherence’ that Sen 
refers to in regard to the state’s role in providing access to justice. 
 
6. THE COLONIAL LEGACY OF THE PAST AND THE NEOLIBERAL DOCTRINE OF THE 
PRESENT 
 
In India, globalisation has created a dichotomy.19 On the one hand, the ‘creative’20 and activist 
traditions that influenced the Constitution, enable it to become “the vehicle of empowerment of the 
untouchables and indigenous peoples (defined respectively as the “scheduled castes” and “scheduled 
tribes”) (Baxi, 2000);(Gauri and Gloppen, 2012). On the other hand, two centuries of colonial rule has 
left a legacy of laws designed with a view to extracting resources from the colony, and to controlling 
local populations who might be harmed in the process. Much of the political and legal culture in India 
was initially adopted unchanged by the independent Indian government, which reinforced and 
maintained the exploitation of the subaltern populations in many ways, creating an ‘internal 
colonisation’ situation in the county, divided along lines of class and caste. “Postcolonial legality thus 
stands sited in the dialectics of repression and insurgency” (Baxi, 2005, 544). It continues colonial 
laws’ repressive legacies and even innovates these through the regimes of security legislations (Gauri 
and Gloppen, 2012). The Forest Rights Act is an attempt to correct historical injustices of land tenure, 
but it is impeded by the two barriers of the colonial legacy of the past, and the neoliberal doctrine of 
the present. The law has been complicit in the oppression of the poor and marginalised groups. 
                                        
19  Globalisation is a process of international trade and investment that has occurred throughout 
history. The debate on the effects of globalisation includes a critique of profits taking priority over 
rights of people and communities. http://www.globalization101.org/what-is-globalization/ 
20 ‘Creative’ is the expression used by Sircar to describe the interventions by the Indian Supreme 
Court such as Public Interest Litigation, and Social Action Litigation to protect human rights of 
marginalised communities. 
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Though it promises access to justice, security and protection, it has not served this purpose in India.  
(Galanter, 1983, 6). This conflict has created a legal dysfunction. 
 
The displacement of the Gaddi community exemplifies the tension between neoliberal statecraft and 
rights-based legislation such as the FRA. The legislative framework of the FRA was undermined and 
subverted by the agenda of economic growth driven by a collusion of neoliberal governance and the 
private sector. I have discussed above how access to justice and commitment to rights and social 
justice in the form of progressive legislation has been thwarted by certain inherently incompatible 
expanding neoliberal economic ideologies of the government. The marginalisation of the Gaddi 
community is compounded by juridical alienation, caused by lack of knowledge of customary and 
formal legal traditions, as outlined in the second section of this article. This alienation exacerbates the 
lack of access to justice for Adivasis in India. 
 
Amartya Sen’s scrutiny of “the intellectual edifice of human rights” outlined in section three, may 
help us understand the attitudes of Indian officialdom in the case of the arrested tribal women in the 
Chamba case study. The Chamba women’s rights to justice are not realised, since this entitlement, 
according to Sen’s critique is not ‘sanctioned’ by the representatives of the state, who would be the 
‘ultimate legal authority’ to legitimise the rights. The representatives of the state, whether it be the 
Himachal Pradesh High Court, the police, the Chamba Deputy Commissioner, the MOEF, acting in 
concert with GMR the private company, do not ‘value’ these rights of the tribal forest people, whether 
they be women or men. Since these actors have both the political-economic power and legal 
knowledge the tribal communities do not possess, indigenous rights are overridden. Dash and Khotari 
estimate that in postcolonial India, roughly 100,000 to 300,000 forest people have been evicted from 
their lands, and “several million more deprived fully or partially of their sources of livelihood and 
survival” (Dash and Khotari, 2013, 152). The statistics from the National Commission for Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes highlights the impoverishment of Adivasis: 83 percent of the country’s 
bonded labourers are from Scheduled Tribal peoples, and 85 percent of them live below the official 
‘poverty line’ (Bhengra et al., 1999)7. The poverty of the forest tribes is particularly unjust given that 
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“90 percent of India’s coal mines, 72 percent of the forest and other natural resources, and 80 percent 
of India’s minerals, are in Adivasi lands. Over 3,000 hydroelectric dams are also located in these 
areas” (Bhengra et al., 1999, 7). The profits from this natural wealth have never been shared with the 
Adivasis who inhabit these lands. These statistics directly correlate with Sen’s hypothetical cake 
example: a community or tribe, already impecunious, outvoted and outmanoeuvred, protesting against 
further injustice of potential loss of homes, livelihoods, and culture but up against the dominant 
ideology of neoliberal majority improvement. If dispossessed of their lands, the community would be 
left with nothing or ‘no cake.’ Since there has been no precedent set for the GMR company or the 
government officials to share any future profits of the hydroelectricity project with the tribal forest 
peoples, the tribal community would be forced to give up their land without any compensation, and 
surrender their share of the ‘cake’, in the name of majority improvement for economic development.  
  
The modern state’s inclination towards a compact with the private sector has created conditions in 
which the state’s role to protect and care for the welfare of its citizens is no longer a priority. In 
biopolitical discourse,21 the process of displacing marginalised communities from their lands would 
be an example of ‘abandonment’, or neglect towards their social and economic rights. The role of 
modern government is thus questionable, especially if it espouses pastoral care and individual and 
community wellbeing. This is in stark contrast to present global neoliberal governance which has 
fostered the reality of extreme marginalisation of millions of people (Selmeczi, 2009, 520).   
 
Lemke’s discussion of neoliberal norms provides a theoretical framework for the actions of 
officialdom and of the market sector in the Chamba district, which links up with the ‘hollow’ aspect 
of human rights norms with which Sen takes issue. If the Gaddi communities’ rights are not valued, 
sanctioned, and implemented by governments nor respected by the corporate sector, the emancipatory 
                                        
21 Biopolitics describes the interface between the political and biological existence of human beings. Selmecz 
Selmeczi, A. (2009). "…we are being left to burn because we do not count" : Biopolitics, Abandonment, and 
Resistance. Global Society, 24(4). describes “the most quoted “definition” of biopolitics”: “For millennia, man 
remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; 
modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being into question” (Foucault, The 
History of Sexuality, op.cit., p. 143). Anna Selmeczi, ‘"…we are being left to burn because we do not count" : 
Biopolitics, Abandonment, and Resistance’ (2009) 24 Global Society 522 
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intent of rights-based legislation is left unrealised. While stressing that capitalism depends on a 
structured system of values and ethics such as trust, Sen does acknowledge that one of its limitations 
is that it is unable to counteract a tendency to economic inequality. Sen points out that the market 
system is dependent on either the law or on “mutual trust and an implicit sense of obligation”(Sen, 
2001, 265).  Though the role of the government in the neoliberal world is relatively diminished and 
market oriented, the market remains subject to the policies that the government formulates. In order to 
enforce any of these policies and regulate the market, the government relies on the law, as does the 
market. Based on this logic, human rights based approaches can hold governments accountable with 
respect to human rights treaties that they have legally ratified. In addition right-based legislation 
provides support for citizens when they make representations in court, or when they step forward in 
the role of rights holders.  
 
Fights for social and economic rights are increasingly frequent in court cases. This constitutes a 
positive use of the justice system to change political traditions and societal rules towards social 
economic rights. However, “legal and administrative institutions and processes are not themselves 
neutral or unproblematic. They are involved in power relationships”(Galligan and Sandler, 2004, 48). 
The theory that governments could be held accountable if courts were involved in social and 
economic policy, especially over issues relating to poverty, is belied by the fact that courts are often 
staffed by professionals representing different ideologies such as “conservative elite interests” (Gauri 
and Brinks, 2008, vii). Yet positive examples of courts making affirmative rulings on social and 
economic rights do exists, for example Argentina’s 1998 Vicente case where the state was required to 
provide medical services and essential medicines to the marginalized communities. Similarly in 
another example in India in 1981, the Supreme Court astutely created judicially enforceable rights 
concerning housing, education and bonded labour from what were formerly constitutional guiding 
principles, demonstrating their willingness to act upon a moral obligation.22 In contrast, the ruling in 
                                        
22 Gauri quotes Justice  Richard Goldstone: “Activist Indian judges carved out  enforceable social and economic 
rights from the right to life that was judicially enforceable. In this way, they have recognized the right to health 
care, nutrition, clothing, and shelter. The Supreme Court held that a lack of financial resources does not excuse a 
failure to provide adequate medical services. In this way the judges of India have imaginatively fused social and 
Page 25 of 34
Cambridge University Press
International Journal of Law in Context
For Review Only
the Gaddi case illustrates the inconsistency of enforcing social justice norms by governments with 
neoliberal principles.  
 
As demonstrated in the Gaddi instance such inconsistencies increase the perceived ‘abandonment’ of 
community rights by duty bearers. This abandonment may also increase impoverishment of certain 
sections of the population. Wilkinson and Pickett in ‘The Spirit Level’ provide rigorous cross-country 
evidence that increased impoverishment of a few leads to inequality and a reduced standard of living 
for the majority of the population.23 This finding is incompatible with the ‘self-care’ strategy of 
neoliberalism, in which the individual becomes responsible for social ills such as poverty, 
unemployment, illness, and the onus is shifted away from the greater society and governance (Lemke, 
2010, 201). Problematic strategies like these as well as the rising inequality around the world and 
accompanied discontent, products of the neoliberal doctrine, could mean that a pendulum swing away 
from neoliberal ideologies towards a right-based and social justice based idea of the welfare state is a 
hopeful possibility.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
Can new national legislation that is administered by a market oriented government and interpreted by 
a traditional judiciary, successfully respond to the contrasting norms and needs of indigenous 
peoples?  I, this article I have argued that the legal response towards any demands for justice is driven 
by the historical evolution of formal law in a country, which has displaced indigenous legal plurality, 
and by both the political and economic ideologies of the government. With the Gaddi case study of an 
all-women protest for land rights, I have exposed the irreconcilable conflict between neo-liberal 
policies and social justice legislation for India’s indigenous peoples, with the added dimension of 
                                                                                                                          
economic rights with civil and political rights.” (viii) For example, Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, 
Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 SCR516 
23 Wilkinson and Pickett’s study of the National Health Services of the United Kingdom also affirmed 
that societal sharing of responsibility for vulnerable sections of the population benefits all. Richard 
Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger 
(Bloomsbury Press 2011 )  
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gender justice within land dispossession. I have revealed the government’s response to land rights in 
India, and how the neoliberal governance paradigm collides with the country’s rights based 
approaches to governance and development. This article has explored the way in which all these 
factors interface with the quest for justice by indigenous forest peoples, making a case that the 
neoliberal approach, and the alien legal traditions subvert the enactment of land rights legislation and 
undermine legal empowerment 
 
Justice is contingent upon a complex number of factors, which include rights, a commitment to social 
justice by the state, an efficient and activist judiciary,24 and a market economy that accommodates 
community rights.  This is evidenced by the implementation of India’s Forest Rights Act, in which all 
these procedural factors continue to obstruct access to justice for the Adivasis. As I have illustrated in 
this article, these include: insufficient guarantees to allow claimants to pursue their claim and access 
justice; the hindrance caused by poor conceptualisations of the Gram Sabha’s25 role; the obstructive 
framing of the “in addition and not in derogation to other laws” which has caused uncertainties in 
enforcing the FRA legislation, and omissions in the rules. On a broader level, the expansion of the 
global neoliberal economy has resulted in a paradigm shift that is denying universal human rights 
standards.  
 
In practice the implementation of this rights-based law echoes Sen’s critique of the inherent weakness 
of the human rights based approach. In many cases, the central and state governments in India ignore 
the requirements of the Act. This both violates the Forest Rights Act itself, and the principles of 
human rights on which the Act is founded. In India, when committing itself to neoliberal economic 
policies, does the government violate laws that they enacted themselves? Does this dichotomy 
                                        
24 The concept of an ‘activist Judiciary’ in India is reflected in the literature, and indicated above in footnote 23. 
In a similar vein, Sircar writes, “The "dynamics of disenchantment" are partially allayed by the trust that the 
rightsless have placed in the Constitution because of the creative activist interventions by the SC over the last 
several years in the form of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) or Social Action Litigation (SAL) to protect and 
uphold the human rights of a range of disadvantaged communities and individuals…” 551, and he asks “ What 
role has an activist judiciary played in representing the Samvidhan  to the common people to make them "love 
it" and "prize it"? 555   
25 Gram Sabha is a village council. 
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demonstrate the ‘hollowness’ of human rights with suspect political commitment, alluded to by Sen’s 
critique of human rights?  If rights based legislation is not supported by practice, and by approaches 
that are conducive to legal empowerment, and if the duty bearers do not recognise the needs of 
marginalised groups, FRA will be rendered ‘hollow’ and rights to land will not be recognised. India’s 
land rights legislation reflects the commitment to social justice, but it is dependent on the state and the 
judicial machinery for equitable enforcement. Judging from the Gaddi tribal protest, this does not 
necessarily happen, and the power of the corporate sector to appropriate land seems greater than that 
of tribal communities to assert their rights effectively to lay claim to their ancestral lands, rights 
explicitly granted to them under the FRA, to lay claim to their ancestral lands. If the executive branch 
of the government of India does not abide by the provisions of this Act, it is not conforming to the 
UNCESCR “minimum core” of social economic rights. By not responding to the needs of the most 
vulnerable groups, the government is failing to comply with the obligation of meeting the ‘minimum 
essential level’ that must be satisfied by state parties. The indigenous groups are entitled to the 
protection of rights to land tenure, housing, and livelihood.  
 
Democratic elections bring change, through new governments. The policies followed by each 
government support not only the economic and social culture of governance but also the human rights 
values it adopts. After India’s May 2014 elections, a change in elected government also resulted in a 
marked political shift in values relating to social justice. The departing Congress government 
sponsored a plethora of social justice legislation. The governing BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) is 
sharply neoliberal in its beliefs, which may affect the social and economic rights of vulnerable and 
marginalised populations. Rights based legislation promotes social justice and inclusion yet always 
remains dependent for implementation on the commitment of the government of the day. The 
dispossession of people’s lands by the government also raises another more complex question: what 
characteristics of the legal and political system enable those charged with carrying out the law to 
circumvent existing legal frameworks? And I leave the reader with the question: Can new national 
legislation, that is administered by a market oriented government and interpreted by a traditional 
judiciary, successfully respond to the contrasting norms and needs of indigenous peoples?  
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ABSTRACT 
 
Does legislation that grants land rights necessarily ensure justice? The Forest Rights Act of 2006 
(FRA) in India, a landmark social justice law, aims to enhance land security for forest peoples. 
Increasingly displaced by development and extractive industries which intensifies impoverishment, 
indigenous peoples in India should with the FRA, be able to protect their land, their livelihoods and 
their culture. Continued government violations of forest land rights in the name of development, 
highlight that economically vulnerable populations lack the power to take advantage of legislation. I 
examine the tension of current indigenous land struggles in the context of the legal frameworks of the 
FRA, and the neoliberal culture of India.  
 
 
Keywords: Indigenous land rights, Forest Rights Act 2006, gender equality, access to justice, human 
rights, land dispossession, neoliberalism  
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